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Fusion of Libel and Slander M.

Quaere

RAY DOuBLES*

Are certain written publications which were libelous
per se at common law, still actionable as such in Virginia
today under a count in common law libel?
As indicated in the question, we are not concerned here
whether such a publication is actionable under Va. Code
Ann. §8-630 (Repl. Vol. 1957) (Insulting Words Statute).
In order to make the issue a practical one, let us assume that the defendant has published a clearly identifiable cartoon or caricature drawing of the plaintiff, without any accompanying words, which on its face clearly
exposes the plaintiff to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, but does not accuse or impute to him a crime, loathsome disease, unfitness for office, or disparagement of
him in his trade or profession, and the publication does
not cause the plaintiff any special damage.
Such a publication, not being orally spoken, does not
come within common law slander; and not being in
words, it probably does not come within the sphere of the
Insulting Words Statute (but even if it does, that will
not pre-empt the instant inquiry). There is no doubt that
such a publication was actionable as libel per se, at common law, without proof of special damage; malice was
inferred from the nature of the publication; and general
compensatory damage was inferred without proof of
special damage. See generally, 53 0. J. S. Libel and
Sla4zer § 1(a) (1948).
The view is taken in some quarters that such a publi*Judge of the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond, Part II, Richmond,
Va.; B.S., Davidson College; LL.B., University of Richmond; J.D., University of Chicago; Professor 1926-1947, Dean 1930-1947, The T. C.

Williams School of Law, University of Richmond.
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cation is not actionable in Virginia today without proof
of special damage; that common law libel has been fused
with common law slander; that in order for the alleged
libel to be actionable in a common law count of libel without proof of special damage, it must fall within one of
the four classes of slander per se. It is said that all this
has been accomplished by judicial decision and three
principal cases, to be commented upon later herein, are
relied upon to reach that result.
Opponents of this view point out that the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia has not said in express
words that any such fusion has taken place and that this
alleged merger of the two actions is not justified by a
critical study of the cases.
If proponents of the fusion doctrine object that the
hypothetical case supposed, i. e., a cartoon without words,
is not within the purview of their conclusions, the comments which follow are equally applicable to alleged libel
by written words.

In

BuRKs, PLEADING AND PRACTICE

(3d ed. 1934) § 165,

at page 263, a portion of which is quoted in the controversial cases later cited herein, the following is said:
" [W]ords which are slanderous at common
law: 1. Words falsely spoken of a person which impute to the party the commission of some criminal
offense involving moral turpitude, for which the
party, if the charge is true, may be indicted and
punished. 2. Words falsely spoken of a person which
impute that the party is infected with some contagious disease, where if the charge is true, it would
exclude the party from society. 3. Defamatory words
falsely spoken of a person Which impute to the party
unfitness to perform the duties of an office or employment of profit, or want of integrity in the discharge of the duties of such an office or employment.
4. Defamatory words falsely spoken of a party which
prejudice such party in his or her profession or
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trade. 5. Defamatory words falsely spoken winch
though not in themselves actionable, occasion the
party special damage. The first four of these classes
are slanderous per se the other only when special
damage results." (Emphasis supplied.)
In the same section the following gs said of libel.
"Libel is of somewhat wider extent than slander.
All slander when written is libelous, and so is any
"writing, print, picture, or effigy calculated to bring
one into hatred, ridicule, or disgrace.' " (Emphasis
supplied.)
Thus it is an elementary principle that at common law,
words, pictures, .etc., winch expose a person to public
hatred, contempt or ridicule, if written, are libelous per
se, even though if spoken they would not be slanderous
per se unless they fell within one of the four classes set
forth above.
In Moss v Harwood, 102 Va. 386, 392, 46 S. E. 385,
387 (1904), the court, after citing numerous authorities,
quotes from 'CooLEY, ToRts (2d ed. 1888), the reason for
this distinction:
"In other words, injury is presumed to follow the
apparently deliberate act of putting .the charge in
writing or print, or of suggesting it by means of picture or effigy, where mere vocal utterance to the
same effect might be disregarded as possibly harmless." (Emphasis supplied.)
In Chaffin v Lynch, 83 Va. 106, 113, 1 S. E. 803, 807
(1887), the court said:
"For, as defamatory or insulting words written
(and the term includes words printed) indicate
greater deliberatson and malice, and in general are
more permanent and extensive in their operation
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than words spoken, which often proceed from sudden
passion, and may be soon forgotten, so are they more
wounding to the feelings of the person aggrieved,
and consequently more likely to lead to violence and
the commission of the offence [duelling] which was
designed to be suppressed." (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus it is the permanency of a written defamatory
statement, and the deliberation which accompanies -its
publication, that distinguishes it from mere vocal utterances. See 53 C. J. S. Libel and Slander § 8 (1948).
This is the common law rationale which underlies the
distinction between libel and slander, and it is the rationale to which proponents of the fusion doctrine strenuously object. It is argued that today, dissemination of
defamation by the spoken word on radio and television
possesses far more potential for damage than by newspapers; that more people are reached thereby; that the
gossip grapevine is a more vicious vehicle of defamation
than the postcard. These are, of course, possibilities, but
they are simply isolated exceptions. And while they may
serve as a reason to expand the common law rules of
slander, they do not alter the sound reasoning of the
common law that as a general proposition, even today,
the written word, because of its permanence and deliberation, is a greater threat to extensive defamation than
the oral word.
The Controversial Decisions
The first of the three controversial cases is Rosenberg
v. Craft, 182 Va. 512, 29 S. E. 2d 375 (1944). There a
letter had been written by the defendant to the employer
of the plaintiff falsely stating that the plaintiff owed a
debt to the defendant. The Motion for Judgment was in
two counts, one for common law libel, and the second for
insulting words under the statute. The court held that
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the words were "not libelous per se" without proof of
special damage.
The controversy as to whether the common law doctrine of libel per se has been abolished is not precipitated
by the holding in the case, but by certain language used
in the opinion. Immediately prior to quoting from Bunxs
PEAI n G m PRACTICs (3d ed. 1934) § 165, where the
five categories of slander are set out, and instead of using
the preliminary introductory language used in Burks,
the court said at page 518 of the Virginia Reports: "The
common law rule divides false, defamatory words which
will- sustain an action into five classes: . . . [here the
five classes of slanderous defamatory words set out in
Burks, are quoted] ...." (Emphasis added.)
The introductory phrase used by the court is accurate
of course only in so far as it may refer to connmo law
slander for, as seen earlier, defamation at common law
by written words, i.e. libel per se, extended beyond the
four classes of slander per se, and to any words which
expose the plaintiff to public hatred, contempt or ridicule,
even though such words if spoken would not constitute
slander per se.
From the foregoing unfortunate choice of words in the
court's introductory statement, it is said by adherents
of the fusion doctine that the court has abolished the
common law action of libel per se in so far as it extended
beyond slander per se, but they conveniently overlook
the following passage from American Jurisprudence
which the court also relied upon, to-wit:
"A clear statement of the principle applicable is
found in 33 Am. Jur., see. 60: 'As respects a charge
of failure to pay debts, without any imputation of
insolvency, it seems to be settled that a writing containing the mere statement that a person who is not
a trader or merchant, or engaged in any vocation
wherein credit is necessary for the proper and
effectual conduct of his business, owes a debt and
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refuses to pay, or owes a debt which is long past due,
is not libelous per se and does not render the author
or publisher of such statement liable without proof
of special damages. Such a statement does not in a
legal sense necessarily expose the person of whom
it is said to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, nor
does it degTade him in society, lessen him in public
esteem, or lower him in the confidence of the community.' " 182 Va. at 519-520.
Proponents of the fusion doctrine also rely upon Carwile v. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 196 Va. 1, 82 S. E.
2d 588 (1954), in which the Motion for Judgment was
also in two counts: one of libel at common law, and the
other for insulting words under the statute. A M]Ktion
for Summary Judgment was sustained in the trial court.
On appeal the plaintiff admitted at bar that the editorial
sued on was not in fact libelous and he abandoned the
count in libel, and the court said: ". . . therefore no
further reference will be made to it." 196 Va. at 3-4.
The court thus had no further occasion to discuss libeL
The court then held that under the court for insulting
words, the words were actionable per se. In the course of
the opinion the court again set out the four classes' of
slander per se, introducing the paragraph again with the
erroneous phrase: "At common law defamatory words
which are actionable per se are ...." 196 Va. at 7. The
phrase should of course have been: "At common law
slanderous words, etc. .. "
Proponents of the fusion doctrine overlook the fact
that the plaintiff had abandoned his count in common
law libel, and that the court expressly stated that "no
further reference will be made to it." Also, that the
court again incorrectly limited what words were defamatory per se at common law by listing only those
which were slanderous per se.
The third case relied upon by proponents of the fusion
doctrine is Weaver v. Beneficial FinanceCo., 200 Va. 572,
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106 S. E. 2d 620 (1959), another case similar to the
Rosenberg case, supra, in that the defendant mailed a
letter to the Industrial Relations Officer of the Naval
Air Station falsely stating that the plaintiff, who was
stationed there as a mechanic, owed a debt to the defendant. The court again held that the words were "not
libelous per se," citing the Rosenberg case, and again
quoting the American Jurisprudence statement, and that
no special damage was alleged. But leaving aside quotations by the court, the thing the court said in its own
words was: "The issue involved on this appeal is whether
or not the language used in the letter is libelous per se.
[200 Va. at 573] ... We hold that the letter is not libelous per se." 200 Va. at 579.

The Rosenberg and Weaver cases are simply cases in
which the court had to choose between conflicting decisions of other jurisdictions as to whether a letter falsely
charging another with owning a debt was libelous per se,
i. e., whether on its face it holds the plaintiff up to public
hatred, contempt or ridicule; the court chose the view
that it did not. The decisions had nothing to do with a
choice of whether libel was to be fused with slander.
No satisfaction can be gained by proponents of the
fusion doctrine simply because the court in its opinion
appears to seek to ascertain whether the words disparage
the plaintiff in his trade or profession instead of continuing on to ascertain whether the words expose him to
public hatred, contempt or ridicule. Having started partially on an erroneous tact that defamation per se at common law was limited to the four classes of slander per
se, the court logically proceeded to explain why the publication did not fall within any of the four classes. True
enough, if the court had taken its main tact from the
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American Jurisprudence citation, it would have come to
the same result by holding that the words did not expose
the plaintiff to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, and
the present controversy would have been avoided. But
its failure so to do by no means is conclusive of the matter, because regardless of the court's reasoning and purported quotations from other sources, what it actually
held in its own words was that "the letter is not libelous
per se." The court did not confine itself to saying that
the publication was not "defamatory per se," or "not
actionable per se"-but "not libelous per se," which
ought to be sufficient indication that when a proper set
of facts presents itself, the court will say that such a
publication is libelous per se, which it could not very
well say if it has already abolished libel per se by fusing
it with slander per se.
Many have blithely attributed to the court a supposed
compliment of shaking off the lethargy which they say
seems to permeate the law of defamation, and to have
attacked the vexing problem the way in which the law
should move. However, one reads the decisions of the
court in vain to find the first inkling of any purposeful
intent of the court to thus abolish the common law doctrine of libel per se or to merge that action with that of
slander. The plain truth is that proponents of the fusion
doctrine have jumped upon an innocent and obvious error
of the court in quoting from Burks, Pleading and
Practice, and, taking the error out of context with the
remainder of ,the opinion and actual decision, have advanced it as a basis for attributing to the court a purposeful intent to abolish the action of libel per se as it
existed at common law. To attribute such an intent to
the court is simply wishful thinking. Any student of decisions of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
knows that the court, when it overrules a previous decision or adopts one view from a conflict of possible
views, or departs from an established principle, does so
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in unmistakable and clear language, usually after -a

thorough and comprehensive treatment of the matter.
If and when the court decides to abandon as unsound
and obsolete the rationale that the written word is more
vicious than the oral word, it will do so in express and
unmistakable language and not by accidental innuendo.

